So one of the perks of running a blog-style Substack is the power to revisit old posts, purely as a means of reflecting on previous thoughts regarding players, managers, transfers and teams.
It’s nice to determine whether certain situations ended up playing out as expected. And if they didn’t, it’s important to assess the main reasons as to why things changed somewhere along the line.
That brings us to the topic of this week’s Friday post, Ryan Gravenberch. I wrote about him in May as Liverpool’s final season under Jürgen Klopp started to peter out. Since, he’s experienced quite the transformation.
If you didn’t catch that piece at the time, you can read it here. I didn’t want to be too harsh on him as there was clearly plenty of context behind his situation, not least his lack of a pre-season at Anfield, his late arrival from Bayern Munich and his injury niggles.
Nevertheless, I felt his first campaign in England went exactly as expected for the most part. He was a former wonderkid with a high ceiling who had simply experienced a bad year, that was all. I didn’t think his signing did much for Klopp’s top-heavy squad, but he was still worth a bet.
So in my post at the end of last season, I wrote:
Gravenberch has superb technique. He can receive the ball on the move — almost depicting shades of Adam Lallana — and he’s chipped in with a few scoring returns, too, posting four goals and two assists in all competitions.
He isn’t quite there on the defensive side just yet. He’s still young, but I don’t feel especially safe whenever he’s named as a starter.
You need to be careful with defensive numbers — and we’re talking about small margins here — but once compared to Dominik Szoboszlai, Curtis Jones, Alexis Mac Allister and Harvey Elliott in the Premier League, Gravenberch is posting the fewest pressures and pressure regains per 90, and his passing completion says he loses possession more often than all of them.
Is he good enough with the ball to be a bit of a passenger without it? For me, the answer is a definite no. He’s not good enough to be carried, so the work against the ball has to improve under the next man, as do his decisions when he’s attempting to try things.
I’m not sure he possesses the same upside as a Szoboszlai, Mac Allister or Elliott in the final third. At least not yet.
So since I typed those words, the landscape has shifted. Lots of subtle tweaks have been enforced, but the man behind the new-look version of Gravenberch is undoubtedly Arne Slot.
I don’t think we can underrestimate just how much Liverpool have already changed their appearance under their new manager. He hasn’t even been in charge for six months yet, but despite that, the Reds are very much representing his image.
The team’s midfield department is no longer bypassed as Liverpool attempt to advance towards the penalty box. The ball remains on the floor a lot more, and passes tend to be shorter.
Slot has placed more of an emphasis on technical ability by encouraging his midfielders to receive passes from their defensive teammates when under pressure. They must welcome the intensity of their opponents if they want to dance around them once the opportunity emerges.
Thus, it is no surprise that Gravenberch’s stock has increased compared to a player like Wataru Endō, who now looks completely unsuitable. Klopp was excellent at highlighting certain qualities held by his players, but technique was not one of them.
Remember when nobody cared about Zoom? Then a global pandemic happened and forced everybody to stay indoors, and suddenly Zoom became the world’s biggest craze, because out of nowhere, people needed it.
Gravenberch’s case is kinda similar, in a weird sort of way. His best qualities weren’t valued that much by the previous regime, hence his position in the pecking order. But the new boss thinks technique is pretty important. You want coolness and an emaculate first touch? You want Gravenberch, then.
Arguably the biggest stylistic difference under Slot has been the desire to build from the back with the ball remaining grounded. That, coupled with Liverpool’s failed pursuit of Martín Zubimendi, explains why Gravenberch is being deployed in deeper areas nowadays.
He made more sense as a number eight under Klopp, because everything was a bit more vertical. It was end-to-end stuff, which placed an emphasis on the box-to-box running power of the players in the middle. Given that, Mac Allister was sensibly used as Liverpool’s holding midfielder, with the more athletic guys required to run a marathon either side of him every three days.
Slot has also favoured building through the centre, even though there’s hardly ever any space in there. Think Brighton and Hove Albion under Roberto De Zerbi. Again, the demand for certain attributes is suddenly very high compared to before. Composure, spacial awareness, press resistance, retention, progression.
Indeed, Gravenberch deserves plenty of credit for remoulding his own game where possible. In my piece last season, I noted that he lost possession more often than all of his midfield peers on Merseyside.
Well, that’s no longer happening. He’s taken a chill pill. He’s placed a cap on his propensity to take risks. You need that if you want to become a true number six.
The legends of that spot didn’t want their name up in lights. They tucked their shirts into their shorts. They prioritised making the right decision for the collective. Keeping possession ticking over isn’t a sexy job, but it’s pretty essential if you want to be a dominant outfit.
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