Replacing Jürgen Klopp: Setting the Scene
The first instalment of a five-part series dedicated to finding a successor to Jürgen Klopp using data
Jürgen Klopp is a really good manager. Virtually every single football fan on the planet would agree with that statement, even the most partisan Manchester United supporter.
Since his emergence as an unknown prospect in his homeland about 20 years ago, he’s established himself as the ultimate disruptor, possessing enough fire in his belly to have a dramatic impact on the statuses of Mainz, Borussia Dortmund and Liverpool without ever suffering from the dreaded sack.
His presence seems guaranteed to foster evolution. Mainz were in the 2. Bundesliga when Klopp was appointed, but after just a few seasons under his wing, they were playing in the UEFA Cup, now known as the Europa League.
Dortmund were in the middle of the Bundesliga table at the start of Klopp’s reign, but they ended up champions, winning the competition two years in a row while also reaching the final of the Champions League.
As for Liverpool, we’re a bit more familiar with that story. The Reds seemed lost when he was appointed. They hadn’t won the Champions League in 10 years, they hadn’t won their domestic league in 25 years, and they didn’t seem particularly close either. Klopp ended up delivering both, in addition to pretty much every other piece of silverware on offer.
It’s quite clear that he makes a difference wherever he goes. Klopp is worth his weight in gold in the managerial world, but with just a few months remaining of his thrilling Anfield tenure, here’s the part you probably didn’t want to read about.
Before signing Virgil van Dijk, Fabinho and Alisson Becker, the German seemed to have a ceiling in the Premier League, and it was in the region of 75 points. Liverpool also reached three cup finals under Klopp before signing those players, losing all of them.
Last season — yeah, the one we’ve all tried to forget — the Reds failed to qualify for the Champions League by finishing fifth in the Premier League table. Liverpool looked genuinely awful at times. They finished 22 points behind champions Manchester City and had exited every cup competition on the calendar by March.
Well, the man in charge was Klopp, the same guy who finds himself at the summit this term. Go figure.
So what am I getting at? This isn’t my attempt to go full galaxy brain by suggesting that Klopp is, actually, not that good. No, instead, I’m trying to argue that, contrary to popular belief — especially on Merseyside — managers simply aren’t as impactful as the players who play the actual sport, at least not from a data perspective.
Football is weird in that sense. Some managers are worshipped like gods, and perhaps rightly so for being such outliers in comparison to their peers. In England, we’ve got Bill Shankly, Alex Ferguson, Brian Clough, Arsène Wenger, José Mourinho and Pep Guardiola as just a few examples of legendary figures who have delivered dynasties at their respective clubs.
Football has always romanced with the idea of an all-seeing genius who is responsible for everything. For the most part, though, I think the stereotypical manager is given too much credit — or faced with too much criticism — for the success or failure of their team. It sounds simplistic, but the best players usually win.
It isn’t a coincidence that one of Klopp’s biggest strengths throughout his career has been his approach to recruitment. The same goes for Ferguson, Wenger, Mourinho and Guardiola. In fact, the one summer in which Klopp got the transfer window wrong at Liverpool, he proceeded to deliver his worst season at Anfield. Shock?
Erneste Valverde, former Barcelona boss, produced one of my favourite quotes on this subject in a conversation with the Financial Times:
Managers are important, of course. They act as the face of the operation, make the weather surrounding the club, integrate youngsters, decide how is best to deploy their players on the pitch and seemingly have an influence on Carabao Cup finals, but they probably make the headlines a little too often.
Earlier this season, Liverpool faced Arsenal in the FA Cup. In the first half, the Reds simply got battered, with the Gunners causing all kinds of problems for them. They posted 13 shots — including four big chances — worth 1.3 xG compared to just two efforts for Liverpool. But crucially, nobody scored. Arsenal just couldn’t find the net with any of their attempts, with Martin Ødegaard coming the closest by hitting the woodwork.
In the 80th minute of the bout, Jakub Kiwior scored an unprompted own goal to give Liverpool the lead, and I recall seeing immediate reactions on social media suggesting that Mikel Arteta isn’t good enough.
What? The Gunners had already created enough to be out of sight. The manager can coach his team to attack and instruct them how to gain advantages on the pitch before games, but he can’t put the ball in the net, he’s reliant on his players to deliver those moments. And at the opposite end of the pitch, how much of the blame should realistically be aimed in the direction of Arteta for one of his players spontaneously beating his own goalkeeper?
Any manager worth their salt will naturally assume the responsibility for anything bad about their team’s performance when speaking to the media, but a lot of the time, they must just want to shrug their shoulders. A great deal of what happens on the grass stems from what is going on in the minds of the players.
This series will explore possible successors for Klopp using data, but that is notoriously difficult to do. Ian Graham, the scientist who constructed Liverpool’s data science department, labelled managerial analysis as the ‘holy grail of analytics’ in an interview with the New York Times, suggesting the process naturally ‘tends to be conflated with who has the best players’.
Relative success is difficult to judge, and as argued already using Klopp and Arteta as examples, people in football generally have a hard time gauging when the manager deserves credit or criticism compared to when things are completely out of his control.
When scouting for managerial talent, it’s almost too easy to look at whichever team is doing well in terms of results before simply appointing the man in charge and assuming the exact same fortune will be replicated at your club. Nevertheless, it happens all the time.
Roy Hodgson did really well in 2009/10. He got Fulham to the final of the Europa League and also picked up a manager of the year accolade, so Liverpool appointed him to succeed Rafael Benítez. He lasted just six months. The problem? His body of work, tactical approach or playing style was never going to translate to the job at Anfield.
The large majority of opponents are willing to settle for a point against the Reds — who are usually favourites — and Hodgson just didn’t have the philosophy to help his players in their attempts to solve that puzzle every week. That lesson, perhaps above all else, is what Liverpool need to be thinking about as they search for an heir to Klopp’s throne.
In simple terms, which managers are getting their teams to play in such a manner that, once applied to Liverpool’s squad, would aid the players and improve their prospects of winning games on a consistent basis?
Using data to evaluate the precise level of a manager and what they are truly worth in terms of points is a potential minefield, but data can offer an insight into playing styles. The numbers can paint a picture of how a manager’s team is performing under the hood, regardless of results, trophies and shiny awards.
You shouldn’t be appointing that serial winner unless their methods will help your players jump the tactical hurdles they’re presented with every week, and the same goes for that manager of the year, that mid-table maestro or that survival specialist.
So in terms of Liverpool, it isn’t rocket science. You’re dealing with a behemoth in footballing terms. The Reds are the favourites to win 90% of the time, so you need a manager who has the credentials to embrace that status and thrive when expected to find solutions.
The game is about getting the most from the players, so rather than recruiting a manager per se, Liverpool essentially need to recruit a playing style, and one that will hopefully be optimised by the individuals executing it.
In the next edition of this series — out later this week for paying subscribers — we’ll delve a little deeper into the thinking behind the process before finally getting to the good part by exploring the data and identifying some names.
Nothing to add re:the article (which was excellent) but pleasantly surprised to see a wonderful community of insightful comments emerging beneath. First time on Substack so didn’t expect it, but this is wonderful to see.
Great first article Josh, loved it mate!! I think we love getting behind and buying-in to a manager more than any other fan base - and that comes from Shankly's time I think, but you are right, they can only do so much. They can only create the atmosphere and conditions for success.
Harry Redknapp's book at the end, he tells the story of Liverpool's squad in 1984 finishing the season and going on the piss to Ayia Napa for a few days, before the European Cup Final, whereas Roma went to train at altitude in the mountains. The Liverpool team didn't train before the final, they couldn't, the place designated of them was a ploughed field, so they just had a walk and Joe Fagan didn't give a team talk before the match.
Liverpool over powered Roma on the night, and didn't make a game of it. Redknapp's point of the story is 'managing is easy when you have great players'